Employment dynamics of newly established and traditional firms: A comparison of Russia and the Ukraine. by Konings, Joep & Walsh, P
LICOS
Centre for Transition Economics
LICOS Discussion Paper
Discussion Paper 81/1999
Employment Dynamics of Newly Established and Traditional Firms:









TEL: +32-(0)16 32 65 98
FAX: +32-(0)16 32 65 99
http://www.econ.kuleuven.ac.be/licos1
Employment Dynamics of Newly Established and Traditional Firms:
A Comparison of Russia and the Ukraine
by
Jozef Konings










LICOS, Centre for Transition Economics,
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven,
Belgium.








*The Research was undertaken as part of a TACIS-ACE Project T95-4092-R “A
Comparative Analysis of Industrial Restructuring in the TACIS Countries” We are
grateful to Peter Van Maldegem, Hylke Vandenbussche and Ciara Whelan for
comments on the paper. The paper benefited also from presentations at a workshop
in Leuven and a CEPR workshop in Prague.2
Employment Dynamics of Newly Established and Traditional Firms:
A Comparison of Russia and the Ukraine
Abstract
In this paper we test the effects of ownership, competition and disorganisation on firm
level employment dynamics using a unique data set of 150 Russian and 300 Ukrainian
firms. Our results, in contrast to findings in Central and East European Countries,
suggest that newly established firms do not out perform those that existed under
central planning during the transition process. In addition, while competition seems to
play no role in employment determination, disorganisation is shown to constrain firm
employment in the Ukraine but not in Russia. Such outcomes are explained by the
nature and timing of restructuring in these countries.
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I. Introduction
The evolution of manufacturing output, employment and unemployment for
the Ukraine and Russia is shown in Fig. 1 (a) and (b), respectively. All series are
normalised on 1 at the start of transition. The collapse in employment has lagged
behind the collapse in output, while unemployment has remained extremely low in
both countries. A collapse in output and employment is observed in all Central and
East European (CEE) countries in their transition to a market economy. Yet, in most
CEE countries the collapse started earlier than in Russia and the Ukraine. By 1997 a
substantial number of CEE countries were emerging from their deep recessions, as
reflected in the U-shaped pattern of output and employment (Blanchard, 1997). This,
is not yet observed in Ukraine, which indicates that recovery has not started and that
the initial shocks of transition and restructuring are ongoing. A marginal recovery in
Russia shows up in 1997, which may indicate that Russia is in a slightly more
advanced stage in the transition process, although the recent financial crisis may be
expected to constrain this recovery process.
Fig. 1 (a)






























 As outlined in Blanchard (1997), reallocation and restructuring  are the two
key elements of the transition process. Reallocation refers to the movement of
production away from state to private ownership. Restructuring refers to changing the
level and technical composition of labour and capital in search of higher production
efficiency. A distinction can be made between initial restructuring and deep or
strategic restructuring. Initial restructuring refers to reducing over-manning levels in
response to the hardening of budget constraints. The reduction of subsidies to
traditional firms should lead to a collapse of labour demand in traditional firms. Initial
restructuring would thus be reflected in a high job destruction rate and a low job
creation rate. Deep or strategic restructuring requires that fundamental actions be
undertaken aimed at improving the long run performance of the firm. This type of
restructuring can include various actions such as an increase in investment into new
technology, vertical innovations in products and replacement of obsolete capital. Deep
restructuring will eventually be reflected in job creation and a slow down in job
destruction. This reallocation and restructuring process may be expected to change the
sector and regional map of employment. Under Central Planning the manufacturing5
sector was large compared to the standards of market economies, so with transition a
part of the reallocation takes the form of reallocating activities from manufacturing to
services, from large to small firms, from one region to another.
The macroeconomic evolution of employment might hide important
turbulence in firm level employment performance during transition. An example can
illustrate this. A net aggregate employment growth of -5% might be the result of a
gross job creation rate of 1% and a gross job destruction rate of 6%, or alternatively, a
gross job creation rate of 10% and a gross job destruction rate of 15%. Obviously, the
latter suggests a much more active reallocation process than the former. There has
been an increased interest from both labour and industrial organisation economists in
the empirical aspects of gross flows of jobs and turbulence (e.g. Davis and
Haltiwanger, 1992). However, very little work to date examines job reallocation in
transition countries. Konings, Lehmann and Schaffer (1996) study gross job
reallocation in the Polish industrial sector at the start of transition, while Bilsen and
Konings (1998) and Faggio and Konings (1998) study gross job flows for Romania
and Bulgaria. These papers document large job reallocation during the transition
process.
In section II of this paper we study gross job flows for the period between
1990 and 1996 as indicators of reallocation and industrial restructuring in Ukraine and
Russia. We expect to gain some insights into the timing of transition and the
magnitude of reallocation in countries that substantially lag behind the other CEE
reforming countries. We use micro data of 300 firms in Ukraine and 150 firms in
Russia that were collected by personal interviews with the key manager of state,
privatised and newly established (de novo) private firms. The data has a regional bias
towards St. Petersburg in Russia and Kiev/Dnepropetrovsk in the Ukraine, both6
advanced cities in terms of transition within the two countries. Our results suggest that
the transition process started much later in the Ukraine. It is only after 1994 that we
observe firms creating jobs. Large-scale job destruction was still present in the
Ukraine in 1996. In contrast, Russia has undertaken much of its restructuring and
reallocation in earlier periods. In both countries firms in the Traded/Retail sector and
de novo firms are the main job creators during transition while firms in manufacturing
and services contribute mostly to job destruction. In contrast to CEE countries, a lack
of deep restructuring in manufacturing and the slow emergence of the services is a
strong feature of both countries.
A second motivation for this study lies in assessing the effects of ownership,
competition and disorganisation on firm level employment dynamics. In section III of
the paper, we estimate reduced form firm level employment growth equations. We
explain employment growth with ownership, focusing on the difference between de
novo and traditional firms, competitive pressure, or lack of, in product and input
markets, and disorganisation in the vertical links of production.
Evidence from Poland, Bulgaria and Romania suggests that, particularly at the
start of transition, de novo private firms fuel the job generation process. Traditional
firms, privatized and state owned enterprises that existed under central planning, shed
labour in the initial stages of transition and modestly contribute to the recovery
thereafter (Konings, 1997; Bilsen and Konings, 1998). Industrial restructuring can be
expected to lead to the disappearance and shrinking of traditional firms and the
emergence of newly established firms in the private sector. Understanding the
heterogeneous experience of firms is therefore essential if one wants to understand the
details behind industrial restructuring.7
Our results, in contrast to findings in Central and East European Countries,
suggest that newly established firms do not outperform those that existed under
central planning during the transition process. This is explained by the relatively slow
emergence of services in these countries, constrained by the lack of restructuring in
large manufacturing firms that still manage their own services. Competition, as found
in many CEE countries in the initial stages of transition, seems to play no role in
employment determination in either country. As documented in Konings and Walsh
(1999) for the Ukraine, disorganisation in the vertical links of production is shown to
constrain employment. Yet, in this paper this is shown to be absent in Russia. The
absence of such supply side constraints in Russia is explained by the fact that Russian
firms seem to be more advanced in the transition process by 1996. Finally, section IV
summarises and concludes.
II.  Data Description and Aggregate Gross Job Flows
II.1 Data Description
The data we have at our disposal is based on enterprise surveys that were
organized by LICOS in the fall of 1997. The questionnaire covered various aspects of
firm behavior (relating to ownership, production, competition and industrial relations,
amongst other things) in the Ukraine and Russia
1. After an initial pilot study, local
teams of interviewers undertook the surveys with visits to the companies. The sample
framework was set up to cover 50% “traditional” firms, being state owned and
privatized firms, and 50% de novo private firms. In addition, the sampling was
confined mainly to two regions in the Ukraine, Kiev and Dnepropetrovsk, and one
region, Saint-Petersburg, in Russia. The sample covers firms in the manufacturing,8
trade and service sector. In the Ukraine most of the traditional and de novo firms are
located in manufacturing, although there are relatively more de novo than traditional
firms in trade and services. In Russia, most traditional firms are in manufacturing
while de novo firms are spread across the three sectors in equal proportions. The 50-
50 split between the de novo firms and the “traditional” ones in these regions does not
reflect the distribution of the population of firms. We chose this setup in order to
focus on the difference (if any) between these two categories of firms in advanced
regions. This is in line with recent evidence showing that de novo private firms behave
inherently different to SOE’s and privatized ones during transition (Konings, 1997,
Richter and Schaffer, 1995).
Our sample consists of 300 Ukrainian firms and 150 Russian firms, with three
ownership categories: de novo private, one hundred per cent State Owned Enterprises
(SOEs) and privatized previously SOEs. The de novo firms are those which are private
since establishment and for which the date of operation starts after 1989 
2. The second
category refers to firms still in state hands, while the third category includes privatized
firms that were previously state owned. Table 1 gives the sample structure and
summary statistics on size and employment growth for these three categories by
country in 1996. The employment characteristics for SOEs and privatized (previously
SOEs), are shown to be similar. In the rest of the paper we group these two types
under the heading of traditional firms.
The average size of a de novo firm is typically small. The average employment
growth in de novo firms is positive while the average employment growth of
traditional firms is negative. This suggests that initial restructuring by traditional firms
                                                                                                                                                                     
1 The questionnaire is available upon request from the authors.9
(reducing overmanning levels) is still going on in 1996. The firms in the Russian
sample are much larger compared to the Ukrainian sample. In addition while de novo
firms have stronger growth rates in Russia, the average employment growth rate in
traditional firms, especially privatized firms, is far less negative than that observed for
the Ukraine.






Overall sample, 279 -0.023 421 0.09
de novo firms 29 0.10 42 0.25
State firms 598 -0.12 1005 -0.06
Privatized firms 427 -0.16 808 -0.06
II.2. Job Creation and Destruction
In this sub-section we compute gross job flows for the overall sample, per
sector and per ownership class. Following the literature 
3, the gross job creation rate
(Pos) is derived from summing all job gains in expanding firms expressed as a
fraction of all jobs in a defined sample (sector or ownership class) a year earlier 
4.
Similarly, the gross job destruction rate (Neg) is the sum of all job losses in
contracting firms relative to the total number of jobs. The sum of the job creation and
destruction rate gives a measure for job reallocation, called the gross job reallocation
rate (Gross) while the difference gives the net employment growth rate (Net) in a
defined sample. Another measure for job reallocation often used is the excess job
reallocation rate (Excess), which is the difference between the gross job reallocation
                                                                                                                                                                     
2 There were in fact a few firms which were private since establishment and started to operate before
communism early this century. However, these are not considered to be de novo firms.
3 Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), Boeri and Cramer (1992).
4 Often the denominator has average employment over two years instead of employment a year earlier.
This is important if one wants to analyze job gains and losses due to entry and exit of firms. Here we
only focus on continuing firms.10
rate and the absolute value of the net employment growth rate. In other words, the
excess job reallocation rate is a measure of real churning of jobs due to common
movements net of employment growth. Alternatively it can be regarded as an index of
firm heterogeneity.
Table 2a shows the aggregate gross job creation, destruction and reallocation
rates since 1990 for the Ukraine. The gross job reallocation rate increases over time,
from 8% in 1991 to 18% in 1996. Thus, we observe increased turbulence over time,
which we would expect as we move into the transition to a market economy. This
gross job reallocation rate of 18% which is relatively high compared to CEE transition
countries, is predominantly driven by a high job destruction rate. While the gross job
destruction rate is below 10% before 1994, since 1994, the gross job destruction rate
has increased above 10% to reach 15% in 1996. Also the gross job creation rate has
increased over time from well below 1% in the early years of transition to almost 3%
in 1996. Thus it seems that the real restructuring in the Ukraine started after 1994
when we observed a significant increase in both job destruction and job creation.
Table 2a: Gross Job Flows per year for Ukraine
Year Pos Neg Gross Net Excess
1991 0.001 0.078 0.08 -0.07 0.003
1992 0.006 0.049 0.056 -0.043 0.013
1993 0.009 0.094 0.103 -0.085 0.018
1994 0.008 0.101 0.11 -0.092 0.017
1995 0.011 0.144 0.15 -0.122 0.022
1996 0.025 0.153 0.18 -0.12 0.05011
As documented in table 2b, the gross job reallocation for Russia increases
from 7% in 1991 to 19% in 1994, but goes down to 6% in 1996. The decreasing
turbulence is caused by a significant decrease in the job destruction rate. Contrary to
the case in Ukraine, it seems that most restructuring in Russia took place before
1995
5.
Table 2b: Gross Job Flows per year for Russia
Year Pos Neg Gross Net Excess
1991 0.001 0.072 0.073 -0.071 0.002
1992 0.009 0.143 0.152 -0.134 0.018
1993 0.003 0.138 0.141 -0.135 0.006
1994 0.025 0.167 0.192 -0.141 0.051
1995 0.018 0.143 0.161 -0.125 0.035
1996 0.012 0.049 0.061 -0.037 0.023
In table 3a and 3b, we show the annual average gross job flows for the
manufacturing, trade and service sectors in Ukraine and Russia. Starting with the
Ukraine, while job destruction is above 10% in both the manufacturing and service
sector with virtually no job creation, job creation in the trade sector is 6.3% and
dominates the job destruction rate of 4.5%. Thus, it seems that the booming sector is
the trade sector, while the collapsing ones are manufacturing and services. The fact
that job creation in the service sector is so low and job destruction so high might come
as a surprise since this sector was virtually absent under central planning. One
explanation for this is that in the old system services were usually classified within
                                                          
5 Richter and Schaffer (1996), using a comparable survey based firm level data set, report a
gross job reallocation rate of 8% for Russia.12
jobs in manufacturing.  The lack of restructuring and downsizing, or sub-contracting
service jobs, in large manufacturing firms ensures the service sector is constrained by
the performance of the manufacturing sector.
Table 3a: Annual average gross job flows in sectors for Ukraine
Pos Neg Gross
Manufacturing 0.007 0.10 0.107
Trade 0.063 0.045 0.11
Services 0.013 0.126 0.14
The annual gross job flows in Russia are similar to the Ukraine. The
manufacturing and services sectors hardly created jobs, while the job creation rate in
the trade sector dominates the job destruction rate.
Table 3b: Annual average gross job flows in sectors for Russia
Pos Neg Gross
Manufacturing 0.01 0.074 0.084
Trade 0.328 0.091 0.419
Services 0.03 0.17 0.20
Finally, in table 4 we examine the gross job flows according to ownership. We
distinguish between the de novo firms on the one hand and the traditional firms, being
SOEs and privatized firms, on the other. We focus on the year 1996 used in our
empirical work. The gross job creation rate of de novo firms in 1996 is 22% and the
gross job destruction rate only 7%. This compares to a gross job creation rate of 2% in
traditional firms and a job destruction rate of 16%. In Russia, these figures are lower,
but show a similar trend. The job creation rate in de novo firms was 10%, while the
job destruction rate was 5%. In traditional firms, the job creation rate was only 1%
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and the job destruction rate was 5% reflecting there more advanced stage of
restructuring compared to traditional firms in the Ukraine.
Thus it seems that the de novo firms are fundamentally more dynamic in terms
of job creation, and are the main source of growth. There might be a sample selection
bias, i.e. we only observe the surviving de novo firms while the traditional firms that
are non-viable in the market system may still be in the data. In addition there may be a
size bias as de novo are small and may be expected to grow faster than large firms.
Table 4: Gross Job Flows According to Ownership in 1996
Ukraine Russia
Pos Neg Gross Pos Neg Gross
de novo firms 0.22 0.7 0.29 0.104 0.055 0.159
Traditional firms 0.02 0.16 0.18 0.008 0.048 0.056
The observed pattern of job creation and destruction indicates a substantial
process of restructuring in which sector and ownership effects seem to matter. In the
next section we investigate how empirically robust these observations are by
estimating employment growth regressions.
III.   Firm Level Employment Growth
The process of job creation and destruction is ultimately linked to the
underlying process of heterogeneous firm performance. We focus on three main
factors that can potentially determine the process of firm growth in transition
countries: ownership, competition and disorganization.14
Ownership Effects: In the previous section we saw that de novo firms had higher job
creation and lower job destruction rates than traditional ones. We might therefore
expect that de novo private firms would also show higher growth rates also at the
micro level due to their ownership type, while controlling for other variables.
However, it is important to recognize that de novo firms are also typically smaller than
traditional firms. It is a well-known empirical outcome that small firms can have
higher growth rates than large firms. To distinguish the ownership effect from a size
effect, we take into account firm size in our regressions.
Competitive pressure: Transition economies are endowed with relatively rigid product
market structures due to the central planning system. One might expect that increased
competitive pressure should enhance restructuring and efficiency and should therefore
have a positive effect on firm growth. We measure competitive pressure in the product
market by using a firm level indicator as in Nickell (1996). Managers were asked
whether they faced more than 5 competitors in their main product market. We use a
dummy equal to 1 (comp) if this was the case. Competitive pressure in factor markets
is measured on the basis of the number of suppliers. The managers were asked
whether they had many suppliers for their inputs, only a few, or one. We use a dummy
equal to 1 if the firm has many suppliers. We summarize these dummies in table 5.
Firms in the Russian sample are shown to face more competition in both product
markets and factor markets.15
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Disorganization: Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and Roland and Verdier (1997)
recently argued that apart from a reallocation and restructuring process in transition
countries, there is a third key characteristic of transition, called disorganization. With
the collapse of central planning the bilateral relations between suppliers and firms
collapsed, leading to a potentially big disruption in production. We use three measures
of disorganization. The first disorganization measure relates to import dependence of
inputs. In the questionnaire it was asked whether the firm depended heavily on
imported inputs. This would be an indication that the firm was successful in avoiding
disorganization by importing.









Yes 0.26 0.18 0.49 0.20
No 0.74 0.82 0.51 0.80
De novo firms in both countries, particularly in Russia, seem to avoid supply side
constraints by importing their inputs. The second control variable measures the
number of products the firm has. Traditional firms with many products may be hit16
more by disorganization since they are less flexible to adapt their product range to the
market system. This variable is summarized in table 7.
Table 7: Product Ranges by Ownership








1 0.46 0.44 0.70 0.35
2 0.30 0.27 0.20 0.27
3 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.21
4 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.12
5 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.03
Traditional firms have a tendency to have a greater range of products
compared to the smaller de novo firms. This is very apparent in the Russian sample.
A final disorganisation measure is the level of investment in new equipment in 1996.
Firms were asked whether they invested in new equipment in 1996. Roland and
Verdier (1997) also model disorganisation in production during the transition process.
They prefer not to rely on inefficiencies in the bargaining process between initial
buyers and suppliers, but rather focus on the role of search frictions created from the
desire to find new partners in the chain of production. The outside option is
endogenous in a model of two sided search and matching. In the long-term, more
efficient opportunities are available to all. Suppliers and buyers will maintain existing
links until one finds a better match. Search by many bad buyers creates congestion and
reduces the quality of matches in the short-run.  The fall in output is not generated by
the breakdown of supplier and buyer relationships that existed in the planning system
but rather due to the assumption that investment into capital will not be undertaken in
production until a long-term partner is found. No capital investments take place during17
search. Aggregate output in the years after liberalisation contracts due to a fall in
investment demand and the failure to replace obsolete capital inherited from the
planning system. Konings and Walsh (1999) test the theory of disorganisation for the
Ukraine by pointing out how employment growth and the evolution in productivity is
related to measures of disorganisation. They show that disorganisation matters
primarily for traditional firms who are endowed with old equipment inherited from the
planning system. In this paper, we test whether, apart from ownership effects and
competitive effects, disorganisation matters in employment growth while making a
comparison with Russia.





















Table 8 suggests that the firms in the Russian sample in 1996 are at a stage
where they are undertaking deep restructuring compared to those in the Ukrainian
sample.
In summary, the sample of firms in Russia not only generate different trends in
gross job flows over time compared to the Ukraine, but in addition competition and
supply side structures in 1996 are also quite different. The aggregate job flows and
firm level characteristics suggest that Russian firms in 1996, on average, are at a much
more advanced stage of restructuring compared to the Ukrainian firms. In table 9 we
present our estimated effects of ownership, competition and disorganisation on
employment growth for the Ukraine and Russia.18
Table 9 : Dependent variable: Firm Level Employment growth in  1996
Ukraine Ukraine Russia Russia
De novo 0.19* (0.05) 0.03 (0.07) 0.25* (0.06) 0.08 (0.07)
+5 competitors 0.03 (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) -0.06 (0.06) -0.07 (0.06)
Import dependence 0.18*  (0.06) 0.21* (0.06) 0.20*  (0.05) 0.17* (0.05)
+5 suppliers 0.05 (0.05) 0.06 (0.05) 0.01 (0.06) 0.01 (0.06)
# of products -0.07* (0.05) -0.05 (0.04) -0.01  (0.05) 0.05 (0.05)
New equipment 0.12* (0.05) 0.14* (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 0.07 (0.05)
Ln (employment) t-1 -0.07* (0.02) -0.06* (0.02)
Adjusted R
2 0.12 0.16 0.28 0.37
No of observations 250 250 110 110
Note: standard errors in brackets. * denotes statistically significant at the 5%
critical level and ** denotes statistically significant at the 10% critical level. All
equations include sector, regional dummies and a constant.
The results suggest that in both the Ukraine and Russia, new private firms are
not performing significantly better than traditional firms once we control for firm size.
This was not the case in similar studies of CEE countries.  Large firms, due to the
distortions inherited from the planning system, might not be expected to expand
employment during the transition process.  Surviving new entrants would be expected
to grow rapidly to the minimum efficient scale upon learning their market ex-post
entry. Why is this not the case in Russia and the Ukraine? One potential reason why
we find that de novo firms are not outperforming traditional firms could be related to
the linkages the emergence and expansion of de novo firms have with the restructuring
process undertaken in manufacturing. Restructuring of oversized firms in
manufacturing creates the emergence of a service sector and de novo activity in
manufacturing from the outsourcing of activities that were normally undertaken within19
large enterprises before transition.  A lack of restructuring, due to credit constraints
and existence of a barter market for inputs and outputs, in manufacturing is likely to
act as a barrier to entry and growth in de novo firms in both services and
manufacturing.
Further, we find significant evidence that import dependence has a positive
impact on employment growth in both countries. Firms seem more able to grow when
using high quality imports and foreign suppliers.  The structure of competition in
either the product or factor market does not have an impact on employment
performance in either Russia or Ukraine.
  Contrary to the results of Ukraine, we do not find evidence for disorganization
in the vertical links of production in Russia. Investment in new equipment or the
inheritance of a large product range does not seem to constrain employment in Russia
while having very significant effects in the Ukraine. This outcome is explained by the
fact that firms in Russia were at a more advanced stage of restructuring in 1996. The
Ukraine was a late starter. Before 1995 Russia may have suffered more from the
presence of obsolete equipment and large product ranges.20
Conclusions:
This paper uses enterprise level data to examine employment dynamics in
advanced regions of Russia and the Ukraine. An analysis of gross job flows created by
the firms in the sample suggests that real restructuring in the Ukraine started only after
1994 when we observed a significant increase in both job destruction and job creation.
Most of the restructuring in Russia was undertaken before 1995.
The central theme we are interested in is whether we can find any statistically
significant effect of ownership on the process of firm growth after taking into account
size, sector, competition structures and disorganisation in the vertical chains of
production. Our results, in contrast to findings in Central and East European
Countries, suggest that newly established firms do not outperform those that existed
under central planning during the transition process. This is explained by the relatively
slow restructuring of manufacturing that constrains the emergence and growth of de
novo activity in services/manufacturing. In addition, while competition seems to play
no role in employment determination in either country, disorganisation is shown to
constrain employment in the Ukraine but not in Russia indicating the more advanced
stage in the restructuring process of Russian firms.21
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